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We report the first demonstration of quantum key distribution over a standard telecom fiber 
exceeding 100 km in length.  Through careful optimisation of the interferometer and single 
photon detector, we achieve a quantum bit error ratio of 8.9% for a 122km link, allowing a 
secure shared key to be formed after error correction and privacy amplification. Key formation 
rates of up to 1.9 kbit/sec are achieved depending upon fiber length. We discuss the factors 
limiting the maximum fiber length in quantum cryptography. 
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There is currently much interest in using quantum cryptography as a method for 
distributing cryptographic keys on fiber optic networks,1 the secrecy of which can be guaranteed 
by the laws of quantum mechanics. Since any information gained by an eavesdropper causes 
errors in the formed key, the sender (Alice) and receiver (Bob) can test its secrecy. Provided the 
quantum bit error rate (QBER) is less than a certain threshold,2 error correction3,4 and privacy 
amplification5 can be applied to form a perfectly shared key with minimal information known to 
an eavesdropper. 
Since the original proposal by Bennett and Brassard6 in 1984, quantum key distribution 
(QKD) systems based upon transmission of encoded weak coherent pulses have been 
implemented by a number of groups.7-12 The most successful approach for fiber optic based 
systems has been to encode the qubit information upon the phase delay in an interferometer.  In 
the absence of a ‘quantum repeater’ which could regenerate a modulated photon, photon loss in 
the fiber limits the maximum distance over which quantum cryptography may be applied.  As the 
fiber length increases, the signal rate falls to a value approaching that of the intrinsic error rate of 
the receiver’s equipment.   Eventually this results in the QBER exceeding the threshold for 
privacy amplification, preventing a secure key from being formed. Until now this has restricted 
demonstrations of QKD to fiber lengths shorter than 100 km.  We show here that this barrier can 
be exceeded by minimising the contribution to the intrinsic error rate of detector dark count noise 
and stray photons.  With some improvements distances up to 165 km could be possible.   
Our system is based upon a time division Mach-Zender interferometer using phase 
modulation, as shown in Fig. 1. Polarising beam combiner and splitter are used so that photons 
from Alice’s short arm are directed into Bob’s long arm (S-L) and vice versa (L-S). The lengths 
of two routes S-L and L-S are roughly matched using a variable delay line in Alice’s setup, with 
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fine adjustment achieved by using a fiber stretcher in Bob’s long arm. Thus the relative phase 
delays introduced to the two paths by Alice and Bob using their phase modulators, determine the 
probability that a photon exits either output of Bob’s interferometer.  
Photons are generated by a 1.55 µm distributed feedback pulsed laser diode operating at 2 
MHz with a pulse width of 80 ps. The pulses are strongly attenuated so that on average 0.1 
photons per clock cycle leaves Alice’s apparatus. The intensity ratio of the reference pulse 
(though Alice’s long arm) to the encoded pulse (through Alice’s short arm) is 1.6:1, so that the 
encoded signal contains 0.04 photons per pulse on average. Phase modulators controlled by 
custom electronics, in the two interfering routes are used to encode the bit information. The 
signal is multiplexed with pulses from a 1.3 µm clock laser which serves as a timing reference. 
InGaAs avalanche photodiodes operating in gated mode, with a gate width of 3.5 ns and an 
excess voltage of 2.5 V, and cooled to an approximate temperature of -100 ºC, are used to detect 
the single photons. It is imperative for operation over long fibers that the dark count rate in the 
single photon detector is as low as possible. Our detectors typically have a dark count probability 
of 10-7 per ns, along with a detection efficiency of around 12% at 1.55 µm. This corresponds to a 
Noise Equivalent Power of 1.1×10-17WHz-1/2, which is one of the lowest reported to date at this 
operating temperature.  
Thanks to careful alignment of the polarisation maintaining optics, the interferometer 
shows nearly perfect classical interference. An interference fringe visibility of 99.96% has been 
obtained for a 122km fiber link, as shown in the inset of Fig. 2. To our knowledge, this is the 
best visibility achieved so far for a quantum cryptographic interferometer. For quantum 
interference experiments, the signal laser was attenuated to 0.1 photons per clock cycle leaving 
Alice’s apparatus. Bob’s detector was synchronised by the 1.3 µm clock laser. The phase was 
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varied by applying a DC bias to the piezo-driven fiber stretcher in the long arm of Bob’s 
interferometer. Figure 2 shows the quantum interference visibility as a function of the fiber 
length, displaying values as high as 99.7% for short fiber lengths. 
The quantum interference fringe visibility is greater than 99% for lengths up to 65 km 
and decreases for longer fiber lengths.  Beyond 65 km, the fiber attenuation reduces the signal 
rate to a value comparable to the intrinsic error rate in Bob’s detector.  Nevertheless, by 
minimising the intrinsic error rate, we have achieved a visibility of 88.4% at 122 km. There are 
two major contributions to the intrinsic error rate which limits the visibility.  (As we discuss 
later, a third source of errors also contributes to the QBER.)  These are, firstly, the dark count 
noise of the detector, and, secondly, stray light from the intense clock laser which is not fully 
filtered by the wavelength-division multiplexing (WDM) filter.  The probability of an error count 
per clock cycle (Pe) was measured to be 8.5x10-7.  Of this, the probability of a detector dark 
count in the 3.5 ns gate was measured to be 3.2x10-7.  This shows that the contribution from stray 
light dominates over that due to the detector dark count, suggesting that the visibility (and 
QBER) could be improved by stronger filtering of the clock laser.   
The dependence of the visibility on fiber length (L) can be modelled using the expression: 
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in which µ is the average photon flux leaving Alice’s apparatus, 10/10 Lα− represents the fiber 
attenuation across a fiber with length L and ηBob the detection efficiency of Bob’s setup.  Using 
the measured values of µ=0.1, ηBob=0.045 (which includes both the finite detector efficiency and 
Bob’s apparatus transmission loss of 5 dB) and the specified value of fiber attenuation α=0.2 
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dB/km, the calculated visibility, shown as the solid line in Fig. 2, fits the experimental data 
reasonably well.  
The QBER can be predicted from the quantum interference visibility. The QBER is 
defined as the ratio of the number of erroneous bits in the sifted raw key to the total number of 
the sifted bits.  For BB84 protocol, the QBER e can be written as 
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If the QBER is less than 11%,2 Alice and Bob can form a shared key with minimal information 
known to an eavesdropper, by classical error correction3,4 and privacy amplification.5  The 
QBER calculated with Eq.2 and Pe=8.5×10-7 is shown as the dashed line in Fig.3, suggesting 
secure key distribution over 120 km is possible.  
To achieve this range, the phase of the interferometer and the photon polarisation must be 
stable during the key distribution.  A drift in the phase of the interferometer, due to variations in 
the relative lengths of the two arms, could contribute directly to the QBER. By casing both 
Alice’s and Bob’s setups in enclosures to prevent air convection, we found the phase drift rate to 
be less than 0.05º per second, allowing key distribution to be performed over several minutes. 
Polarisation drift reduces the bit rate, but does not degrade the QBER provided that the signal 
rate is significantly higher than the intrinsic error rate.  We found that the polarisation is stable 
for >30mins for a 122 km fiber link without any noticeable drop in the bit formation rate.  
QKD was performed using the well known BB84 protocol.6 Two separate computers 
control Alice and Bob’s electronics, and exchange the classical information (about encoding 
bases and photon detection times) required for key formation over the Internet using the TCP/IP 
protocol. The measured QBER, shown in Fig. 3, remains virtually constant at around 3.3% for 
fiber lengths up to 65 km. For these fiber lengths, the contributions due to detector dark counts 
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and stray light are less than 0.4%, as shown by the calculated result (dashed line in Fig.3). 
Imperfections of the interferometer also play a minor role, as the classical interference visibility 
is better than 99.9%. The dominant contribution to the QBER for short fibers derives from errors 
in the phase modulation, resulting from slight inaccuracies of the phase modulator biases, as well 
as phase drift during the experiment. Beyond 65 km, the QBER increases with fiber length, due 
to the erroneous counts caused by the detector dark counts and stray light. The simulation, 
including both modulation errors and erroneous counts, shown as the solid line in Fig. 3, fit the 
experimental data well. At 122 km, the QBER averaged over a 2-minute key transfer is typically 
8.9%. This error rate is below the 11% limit,2 thus allowing us to perform error correction and 
privacy amplification to form a shared key as described below.   
The sifted bit rate, as shown in Fig. 4, decreases with increasing fiber length at a rate of 
~0.21 dB/km, close to the specified value of standard single-mode telecom fiber. The average 
sifted raw bit rate is 3.4 kbits/s for 4.4km of fiber, falling to 23.4 and 9.2 bits/s for 101 and 
122km, respectively.  To form a secure key we first applied a Cascade error correction routine,4  
followed by Privacy Amplification, which compressed the reconciled key to a much shorter 
one13 and thereby reduced the information known to Eve.  The open symbols in Fig. 4 show the 
key formation rate after error correction and privacy amplification.  At QBER e=3.3%, the key 
formation rate is around half of the sifted raw bit rate, while at e=8.9% the key formation rate 
falls to 4.6% of the sifted raw bit rate.  
The net bit rate falls to zero when the QBER approaches the security limit of 11%.2  
Interpolation of the collected data suggests the current system will approach the security limit 
(ie. QBER<11%) with a fiber length of 130 km.  By eliminating the modulation errors and with 
better rejection of the clock laser light, the range of the system could be extended to 165 km.  
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Indeed, the visibility of the quantum interference (µ=0.1) is measured to be 86% for a 165.8km 
fibre link after removing stray light by electronically synchronising Bob’s detector, suggesting a 
QBER of 7.0% and therefore successful QKD is achievable at this length. Further increases 
would then rely upon improvements in single photon detection technology, the receiver’s 
transmission and the key formation protocols.   
We discuss now pulse splitting attacks, where Eve uses the multi-photon photon pulses 
inevitably generated by a laser diode to gain information about the key.13,14  In an optimal attack, 
Eve replaces her link to Bob with a lossless channel and allows only the multi-photon pulses to 
pass to Bob after removing exactly one photon for measurement.  Such an attack is not feasible 
using today’s technology, but is important to consider for guaranteeing unconditional security.  
To be secure from this attack in the worst case, the bit rate measured by Bob must exceed the 
rate of multi-photon pulses generated by Alice.14  This condition imposes a limit of ~50 km for 
the current system.  Unconditional security may be achieved for longer fibers and with higher bit 
rates by replacing the attenuated pulsed laser diode in the current system with a true single 
photon source.15 Free space QKD with a single photon source has recently been 
demonstrated.16,17 
 In summary, we have demonstrated quantum key distribution over 122 km of standard 
telecom fiber using the BB84 protocol. The QBER at 122 km was measured as 8.9%. The 
dominant contributions to the QBER were identified as arising from phase modulation errors, 
false counts due to stray clock laser photons and detector dark counts, indicating further 
improvements in the range of quantum cryptography may be possible.   
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Figure captions 
 
Figure 1 A schematic diagram showing the fiber optic quantum key distribution (QKD) system 
using BB84 phase encoding. WDM: wavelength division multiplexer; FS: fiber stretcher; PBS: 
polarization beam combiner/splitter; PC: polarization controller. The delay loop causes an optical 
delay of 5.8 ns between the short and long arms in Alice or Bob’s interferemeter. Standard 
telecom fibers (Corning SMF-28) are used in the link between Alice and Bob.  
 
Figure 2 Quantum interference visibility as a function of fiber length for a laser strength of 0.1 
photons per clock cycle. The solid line plots the value calculated with Eq.1 and measured 
parameters.  The inset shows the classical interference fringes recorded for a 122 km link. 
 
Figure 3 The measured QBER as a function of fiber length (solid symbols). The dashed line 
shows the QBER calculated using Eq.2 and the measured detector erroneous counts, while the 
solid line is contribution from both the detector erroneous counts and the modulation error. 
 
Figure 4 The sifted raw bit formation rate (solid symbols) and the key formation rate after error 
correction and privacy amplification (open symbols) for different fiber lengths.  
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